On Bounded Dominance Criteria by Ooghe, Erwin & Lambert, Peter J.
On bounded dominance criteria∗
Erwin Ooghe and Peter J. Lambert
April 26, 2005
Abstract
A well-known criterion to make heterogeneous welfare comparisons is Atkinson and
Bourguignon’s (1987) sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGLD) criterion.
Recently, Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) convincingly argue that it con-
tains unreasonable household utility profiles and suggest to put (lower and upper)
bounds on the needs of the diﬀerent household types. First, we generalize Atkinson
and Bourguignon’s SGLD criterion, by introducing lower bounds in the household
utility profiles. Second, we propose a new SGLD criterion by introducing upper
bounds in a similar way. Third, we impose lower and upper bounds simultaneously
and obtain a criterion which is intermediate between Ebert’s (1999) equivalence
scale weighted approach and Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) SGLD approach.
1 Introduction
If we do not want to cardinalize needs diﬀerences via equivalence scales (Ebert, 1997,
1999, Shorrocks, 2004), the most well-known way to make heterogeneous welfare com-
parisons is the so-called “ordinal” sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGLD)
test. It boils down to classifying households in diﬀerent needs groups and checking –on
the basis of the generalized Lorenz dominance criterion applied to household incomes–
whether the most needy are better oﬀ, whether the most and second most needy are bet-
ter oﬀ, and so on. This result is due to Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), and extended
by Atkinson (1992), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), Chambaz and Maurin (1998), Moyes
(1999) and Lambert and Ramos (2002) to deal with changing demographics, poverty
and/or the principle of diminishing transfers.
As noted, none of these results are predicated upon equivalence scales. A recent sug-
gestion of Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003), building on work of Bourguignon
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(1989), allows for the use of a variety of equivalence scales, not specified except for lying
between lower and upper bounds. Motivated by this idea, we here first generalize Atkin-
son and Bourguignon’s SGLD criterion by introducing lower bounds in the household
utility profiles. Such a lower bound tells us, for example, that a couple with an income
equal to or lower than αy (with α ≥ 1) is worse oﬀ than a single with income y (for
all income levels y). In section 3, we describe the corresponding sequential procedure
applied to household incomes, which have to be divided and weighted1 by (a multipli-
cation of) the lower bounds; if all lower bounds equal 1, we are back in the standard
case.
Second, in an analogous way, we introduce upper bounds in the household utility profiles.
Such an upper bound tells us, for example, that a couple with an income equal to or
higher than βy (with β ≥ α) is better oﬀ than a single with income y (for all income
levels y). In section 4, we introduce a reversed sequential procedure applied to household
incomes, which again have to be divided and weighted in this case by (a multiplication
of) the upper bounds, but the sequencing is exactly the opposite. This stands to reason:
if we divide the household income of the couple by the upper bound β, singles are more
needy than couples whenever they have the same scaled income. One specific case
deserves further attention. Choosing upper bounds on the basis of household size, we
obtain a sequential dominance procedure applied to distributions of individuals with per-
capita incomes, but, in contrast with Jenkins and Lambert’s (1993, p. 343) proposal,
starting from the singles, followed by singles and couples, and so on.
Third, in the spirit of Fleurbaey et al. (2003), we consider lower and upper bounds
simultaneously in Atkinson and Bourguignon’s setting. We obtain in section 5 an im-
plementable criterion, which reduces to Ebert’s (1999) approach when the lower bounds
equal the upper bounds and to (Jenkins and Lambert’s extension of) Atkinson and
Bourguignon’s (1987) SGLD criterion when the lower bounds equal one and the upper
bounds approach infinity.
2 Notation
Consider household incomes y ∈ R+ and household types k ∈ K = {1, ...,K}. Types
are ordered from least to most needy (given the same household income); as such, k
could be household size. The well-being level of a type k household as a function of
income is measured via a (twice continuously diﬀerentiable) household utility function
Uk : R+ → R. A heterogeneous distribution consists of (i) proportions of type k
households, denoted pk, with
S
k∈K pk = 1, and (ii) income distribution functions of
type k households, denoted Fk, assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable and defined
1The weighting procedure is the same as the one proposed in Ebert (1997, 1999) and Ebert and
Moyes (2003).
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over a finite support [sk, sk] (and thus equal to zero or one outside this support), with
all sk > sk > 0. We abbreviate a distribution as F = (p1, . . . , pK , F1, . . . , FK) and
G = (q1, . . . , qK , G1, . . . , GK) denotes an alternative distribution. For brevity, we thus
directly focus on the case where demographics might be diﬀerent between distributions.
We want to derive an implementable criterion which tells us whether the diﬀerence in
average utility between two distributions
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] sk
sk
Uk (y) d (pkFk (y)− qkGk (y)) , (1)
is positive (or negative) for all utility profiles U = (U1, . . . , UK) satisfying certain prop-
erties. The reasonableness of such a criterion clearly depends upon the reasonableness
of the properties we impose on the utility profiles. In the sequel, we always focus on
utility profiles U = (U1, . . . , UK) where the marginal utility of income2 –called social
priority– of all household types is positive (A1a), but decreases with income (A1b):
A1: U

k ≥ 0, for all k ∈ K (A1a) and U

k ≤ 0, for all k ∈ K (A1b).
In terms of income transfers, A1a –known as the Pareto condition– ensures that more
income for any household improves social welfare, whereas A1b –known as the (within
type) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle– tells us that an income transfer from a richer
to a poorer household of the same type increases welfare.
3 Lower bounds
A lower bound vector is defined as α = (α1, . . . ,αK) ≥ (1, . . . , 1); we choose the least
needy type, type 1, as the reference type, or α1 = 1. As in Fleurbaey et al. (2003), these
lower bounds capture judgements about the needs diﬀerences between adjacent types
only; for later use, we define an equivalence scale vector with respect to the reference
type, as α∗ = (α∗1, . . . ,α∗K) with α∗k =
Tk
i=1 αi. We might impose the following condi-
tions on utility profiles (U1, . . . , UK) for a given lower bound vector α and a maximum
income level a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, s2α∗2
, . . . , sKα∗K

(an explanation follows):
A2α : U

k(αky)− U

k−1(y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
A3α :

U

k(αky)− U

k−1(y)

≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
A4α : Uk(α∗ka) = Uk−1(α
∗
k−1a), for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
2 It tells us where to put our money first as a social planner who maximizes the average household
utility.
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Assumption A2α is due to Fleurbaey et al. (2003): together with A1, it tells us that a
household of type k has a higher social priority compared to a household of type k− 1,
if the former’s household income is suﬃciently low, i.e., lower than αk times the latter’s
household income. Assumption A3α is an adaptation of Atkinson and Bourguignon’s
condition: it tells us that the previous diﬀerence in social priority (described in A2α)
decreases with income. Assumption A4α is an adaptation of Jenkins and Lambert’s
(1993) condition to deal with changing demographics: there exists incomes α∗ka where
utility levels become equal. Somewhat weaker, one could use a variant of Moyes’ (1999)
condition, which, together with A1, says that a household of type k is worse oﬀ than a
household of type k − 1, if the former’s household income is suﬃciently low, i.e., lower
than αk times the latter’s household income:
Uk(α
∗
ky) ≤ Uk−1(α∗k−1y), for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
This would add the conditions
SK
i=k (pi − qi) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K to proposition 1 below.
Choosing α = 1 = (1, . . . , 1), the above assumptions reduce to the ones considered by
Bourguignon (A1, A21), Atkinson and Bourguignon (A1, A21, A31) and Jenkins and
Lambert and Chambaz and Maurin (A1, A21, A31, A41).
We denote with Uα the family of utility profiles U = (U1, ..., UK) satisfying assumptions
A1, A2, A3α, and A4α, for a given α (and given a, which will remain fixed, and may
be omitted in the sequel). We say that a distribution F welfare dominates G according
to the family Uα, denoted F ?α G, if and only if the welfare diﬀerence ∆WU , defined
in (1), is non-negative for all profiles U in Uα . The following proposition shows how
the welfare dominance quasi-ordering ?α can be implemented via sequential dominance
conditions (a discussion follows):3
P?????????? 1. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G as well as a lower
bound vector α ∈ RK with αk ≥ α1 = 1 for all k ∈ K and an exogeneous income level
a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

, with α∗k =
Tk
i=1 αi for all k ∈ K. We have
F ?α G⇔
K[
i=k
Hi (α
∗
i y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a] and for all k ∈ K, (2)
with Hk : R+ → R : y :→
U y
0 (pkFk (x)− qkGk (x)) dx, for all k ∈ K.
The sequential conditions are applied to household incomes –which are both divided
and weighted by the lower bound equivalence scales in α∗, as in Ebert (1997,1999)–
and starting from the most needy type, followed by the most and second most needy
types, and so on. Choosing α = 1, our criterion reduces to Jenkins and Lambert’s
3All proofs can be found in the appendix.
4
extension of the SGLD criterion. If, in addition, demographics are the same in both
distributions, then ?α is equivalent with Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) SGLD
criterion.
4 Upper bounds
In a similar way, we might also impose upper bounds via a vector β = (β1, . . . ,βK) ≥
(1, . . . , 1), reflecting the idea that there are limits to the needs of the “more needy”.
Again type 1 is the reference type, or β1 = 1, and we define an equivalence scale
β∗k =
Tk
i=1 βi with respect to this reference type. For example, it is generally accepted
that a couple does not need more than twice the income of a single to reach the same
living standards. We might impose one of the following conditions on utility profiles
(U1, . . . , UK) for a given upper bound vector β and an exogeneous income level a ≥
max

s1
β∗1
, s2β∗2
, . . . , sKβ∗K

:
A2β : U

k(βky)− U

k−1(y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
A3β :

U

k(βky)− U

k−1(y)

≥ 0, for all y ∈ R+, for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
A4β : Uk (β∗ka) = Uk−1

β∗k−1a

, for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
The interpretation is much as before. Assumption A2β is again due to Fleurbaey et
al. (2003): together with A1, it tells us that a household with type k has a lower social
priority compared to a household with type k − 1, if the former’s household income is
suﬃciently high, i.e., higher than βk times the latter’s household income. Assumption
A3β tells us that the (positive) diﬀerence in social priority, described in assumption A2β ,
becomes less important when incomes grow larger. Finally, according to assumption A4β
there exist incomes β∗ka where all utility levels become equal.
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Let ?β be the quasi-ordering which corresponds with welfare dominance according to all
profiles in the family Uβ , defined as the family of utility profiles (U1, ..., UK) satisfying
assumptions A1, A2β , A3β , and A4β , for a given upper bound vector β (and given
a). Our next proposition shows how welfare dominance for ?β can be implemented via
sequential dominance conditions:
P?????????? 2. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G as well as an upper
bound vector β ∈ RK with βk ≥ β1 = 1 for all k ∈ K and an exogeneous income level
4Also here, one could use a variant of Moyes’ (1999) condition, Uk(β∗ky) ≥ Uk−1(β∗k−1y), for all
y ∈ R+, for all k = 2, . . . ,K, (with a similar interpretation as before) which would add the conditionSk
i=1 (pi − qi) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K to proposition 2.
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a ≥ max

s1
β∗1
, . . . , sKβ∗K

, with β∗k =
Tk
i=1 βi for all k ∈ K. We have
F ?β G⇔
k[
i=1
Hi (β
∗
i y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a] and for all k ∈ K, (3)
with all functions Hk defined as in proposition 1.
The sequential conditions are again applied to household incomes –which are both
divided and weighted, here by the upper bound equivalence scales β∗, as in Ebert
(1997,1999)– but starting from the least needy type, followed by the least and second
least needy types, and so on. If k equals household size, we could choose βk =
k
k−1 , for
all k = 2, . . . ,K, and thus β∗k = k as upper bounds, expressing the view that there are
economies of scale in household size. In this specific case, the above criterion reduces to a
sequential dominance criterion applied to the per-capita incomes of individuals, starting
from singles only, singles and couples together, and so on. The sequence is indeed
reversed, because, for the same per-capita income, singles are most needy, followed by
couples and so on. These conditions have not to our knowledge been seen before in the
welfare dominance literature.
5 Lower and upper bounds
The lower bound criterion in section 3 can deal with (i) transfers from richer households
to poorer and more needy households –where richer and poorer have to be understood
here in terms of equivalent incomes– but not with (ii) transfers from richer households
to poorer and less needy households; exactly the opposite holds true for the upper
bound criterion described in section 4. It is therefore tempting to introduce lower and
upper bounds simultaneously as in Fleurbaey et al. (2003), who consider assumptions
A1, A2α , A2β for some lower and upper bound vectors β ≥ α ≥ 1. Let ?βα be
the quasi-ordering which corresponds with welfare dominance according to all profiles
in the family Uβα = Uα ∩ Uβ , i.e., the family of utility profiles (U1, ..., UK) satisfying
assumptions A1, A2α, A2β , A3α, A3β , A4α and A4β , given upper and lower bound
vectors α,β (and given a) which satisfy β ≥ α ≥ 1.
Note first of all that if α = β and α∗k = β∗k (= mk, say) is an agreed equivalence scale,
then utility profiles (U1, ..., UK) for which Uk (y) = mkU1

y
mk

(for all y ∈ R+ and
for all k ∈ K) where U1 is increasing and concave, not only reconcile the Atkinson-
Bourguignon and Ebert approaches (indeed are obligatory if the normative approach of
Ebert and Moyes (2003) is endorsed), but also belong to Uβα (for α = β), although in
this trivial case of an agreed equivalence scale nothing new emerges, of course.
Assuming that α 9= β, and setting y = 0 in A2α and A2β , U

1 (0) = U

2 (0) = · · · =
U

K (0) is implied of any utility profile (U1, ..., UK) belonging to Uβα . If this common
6
marginal utility value at the origin is finite, then from A3α and A3β , there exist scalars
b ≥ 0 and ak, for all k ∈ K, such that Uk (y) = by + ak (for all y ∈ R+ and for all
k ∈ K). In order that A4α and A4β should also hold, along with twice diﬀerentiability
of all utility functions, b = 0 is then required. Hence, if α 9= β, all non-trivial profiles
of utility functions in Uβα have infinite first derivatives at y = 0. In fact, for each utility
profile in Uβα , conditions
Uk (y) = U and U

k (y) = U

for all α∗ka ≤ y ≤ β∗ka and for all k ∈ K
are implied for appropriate scalars U and U

, the latter of which is of course zero if
α 9= β (and then Uk (y) = U for all y ≥ α∗ka and for all k ∈ K). Fleurbaey et al.’s
(2003) condition to deal with changing demographics is weaker. Given a, it boils down
to
A5 : There exists a vector (a2, . . . , aK) ∈ RK−1+ such that Uk (ak) = U1 (a) and
U

k (ak) = U

1 (a) for all k = 2, . . . ,K.
Before presenting our main propositions, we summarize Fleurbaey et al.’ s theorem.
Let ?FHT be the quasi-ordering which corresponds with welfare dominance according
to all profiles in the family of utility profiles (U1, ..., UK) satisfying assumptions A1,
A2α, A2β and A5. This is a superset of Uβα and therefore ?FHT -dominance must imply
?βα-dominance.
F????????, H?????? ??? T?????? (2003). Consider two heterogeneous distribu-
tions F and G as well as lower and upper bound vectors α,β ∈ RK with βk ≥ αk ≥
1 = β1 = α1, for all k ∈ K, and an exogeneous income level a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

.
Define (for each k ∈ K) a function Hk as in proposition 1. Setting ZK = HK , define
functions Zk recursively (starting from k = K downwards to k = 2) as
Zk−1 : y :→ Hk−1 (y)+ max
αky≤x≤βky
{Zk (x)} .
Now, F ?FHT G holds if and only if Z1 (y) ≤ 0 holds for all y ∈ [0, a] .
Our next proposition shows how welfare dominance for ?βα can be implemented; a
discussion follows:
P?????????? 3. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G as well as lower
and upper bound vectors α,β ∈ RK with βk ≥ αk ≥ 1 = β1 = α1, for all k ∈ K, and an
exogeneous income level a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

. Define an indicator function I which
equals one if its argument is true, and zero otherwise.
Suﬃcient conditions. Let ZK = HK . Recursively define functions (starting from k = K
downwards to k = 2)
Zk−1 (y) = Hk−1 (y)+I (Zk (αky) ≤ 0)Zk (αky)+I

y ≤ α
∗
ka
βk

I (Zk (βky) ≥ 0)Zk (βky) .
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We get
if Z1 (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, a] , then F ?βα G. (4)
Necessary conditions. Let ZK = HK . Recursively define functions (starting from k = K
downwards to k = 2)
Zk−1 (y) = Hk−1 (y)+I

Zk (αky) ≥ 0

Zk (αky)+I

y ≤ α
∗
ka
βk

I

Zk (βky) ≤ 0

Zk (βky) .
We get
if F "βα G, then Z1 (y) < 0 for some y ∈ [0, a] . (5)
First, the suﬃcient conditions Z1 (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, a] can be used to check whether
F ?βα G holds, while we can exclude the strict dominance case F "βα G whenever the
necessary conditions are not satisfied, i.e., whenever Z1 (y) ≥ 0 holds for all y ∈ [0, a].
Second, in case the lower and upper bound vectors α and β coincide, so that an equiv-
alence scale mk = α∗k = β
∗
k is in fact implied for the types k, the function values Z1 (y)
and Z1 (y) are equal to
S
k∈KHk (mky). The suﬃcient conditions in this case yield
[
k∈K
Hk (mky) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, a] . (6)
This corresponds with Ebert’s (1999) proposal: checking whether F generalized Lorenz
dominates G on the basis of household incomes, divided and weighted by equivalence
scales.
Third, we look at the other extreme, i.e., when all βk’s (for k = 2, . . . ,K) approach
infinity. The following corollary tells us that the conditions (4) yield the sequential
conditions (2) of proposition 1 when the βk’s (for k = 2, . . . ,K) approach infinity.
Additionally choosing α = 1 would lead to Jenkins and Lambert’s (1993) extension of
the sequential generalized Lorenz dominance conditions.5
C???????? 1. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G as well as lower
and upper bound vectors α,β ∈ RK with βk ≥ αk ≥ 1 = α1 = β1, for all k ∈ K,
and an exogeneous income level a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

. If β → (1,∞, . . . ,∞), then the
conditions in (4) become equivalent with
SK
i=kHi (α
∗
i y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a] and for
all k ∈ K.
Finally, we compare proposition 3 with Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) criterion ?FHT . Al-
though Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) criterion is implementable, the iterated maximum-
procedure complicates things a lot in practice. In contrast, the functions Zk and Zk can
5 In order to recover the conditions of proposition 2 from those of proposition 3, we would need to
relax the restrictions imposed on α at the start of the paper to allow each αk go to zero.
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be easily calculated, and thus the conditions in proposition 3 are implementable in a
straightforward way. Of course, this practical point would be worthless if our suﬃcient
conditions in (4) would have less ranking power compared to Fleurbaey et al.’s crite-
rion. Our final corollary 2 tells us that this is not the case: whenever F dominates G
according to ?FHT the suﬃcient conditions (4) provided by proposition 3 are satisfied.
Furthermore, whenever G dominates F according to ?FHT , the necessary conditions
(5) provided by proposition 3 cannot be satisfied.
C???????? 2. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G as well as lower and
upper bound vectors α,β ∈ RK with βk ≥ αk ≥ 1 = β1 = α1, for all k ∈ K, and
an exogeneous income level a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

. If F ?FHT G holds, then also
the suﬃcient conditions in (4) are satisfied. If G ?FHT F holds, then the necessary
conditions in (5) cannot be satisfied.
6 Conclusion
Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) welfare ordering in the case where the population is
partitioned into subgroups on the basis of needs is a utilitarian criterion based on social
utility functions which satisfy reasonable conditions, and it can be implemented by
applying the SGLD criterion. This approach was devised as an alternative to invoking
a specific equivalence scale to make a heterogeneous welfare comparison.
In Fleurbaey et al. (2003), it is argued inter alia that the SGLD criterion admits so-
cial utility profiles “considered unreasonable by all practitioners” (ibid., p. 311). An
alternative equivalence-scale-based framework of analysis is advocated, in which (lower
and upper) limits are placed on the relative needs of the diﬀerent household types, by
positing flexible equivalence scales bounded to lie within certain ranges. This leads to
a dominance criterion and an algorithm for implementing it - thereby, Fleurbaey et al.
argue, providing “a middleway criterion” between Ebert’s (1997,1999) fixed equivalence
scale approach and that of Bourguignon (1989).
In this paper we have extended the SGLD criterion, which is not predicated upon
equivalence scales, by introducing lower and upper bounds directly into the household
utility profiles, first separately, and then together. We have obtained new dominance
criteria as the result of this refinement, which retain the character of SGLD and also
relate well to the fixed equivalence scale approach of Ebert (1997,1999), though not
being in any way dependent on the contentious equivalence scale methodology.
When lower bounds are introduced, necessary and suﬃcient sequential conditions arise,
in terms of divided and weighted household incomes, starting from the most needy
type, followed by the most and second most needy types, and so on. When upper
bounds (only) are introduced, a reversed sequential procedure proves to be necessary
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and suﬃcient, starting with the least needy group (singles), followed by the two least
needy groups taken together (singles and couples) and so on.
When lower and upper bounds are introduced simultaneously, separate necessary and
suﬃcient criteria are determined, which are intermediate between Ebert’s (1997,1999)
equivalence scale weighted approach and Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) sequential
GLD approach. Finally, compared with Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) criterion, our suﬃcient
conditions can be easily implemented and allow for a more complete ranking, which
should be of interest to practitioners.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Suﬃciency: Given two distributions F and G, define functions hHk = pkFk − qkGk
for all k ∈ K, so that Hk (y) =
U y
0
hHk (x) dx. The diﬀerence in welfare for a profile
U = (U1, . . . , UK) ∈ Uα equals:
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] sk
sk
Uk (y) d hHk (y) =
[
k∈K
] α∗ka
α∗ka
Uk (y) d hHk (y) ,
with 0 < a < min

s1
α∗1
, . . . ,
sK
α∗K

and a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

. Using partial integration
twice, together with the definition of Hk, a change of variable and assumption A4α , we
get
∆WU = −
[
k∈K
U

k (α
∗
ka)Hk (α
∗
ka) +
[
k∈K
] α∗ka
α∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy
= −
[
k∈K
U

k (α
∗
ka)Hk (α
∗
ka)
 ~} 
A
+
] a
a
[
k∈K
α∗kU

k (α
∗
ky)Hk (α
∗
ky)
 ~} 
B
dy
We can rewrite A and B as
A = − U 1 (a) ~} 
≥0 via A1
[
i∈K
Hi (α
∗
i a)−
K[
k=2

U

k (α
∗
ka)− U

k−1

α∗k−1a

 ~} 
≥0 via A2α
#
K[
i=k
Hi (α
∗
i a)
$
B = α∗1U

1 (α
∗
1y) ~} 
≤0 via A1
[
i∈K
Hi (α
∗
i y) +
K[
k=2

α∗kU

k (α
∗
ky)− α∗k−1U

k−1

α∗k−1y

 ~} 
≤0 via A3α
#
K[
i=k
Hi (α
∗
i y)
$
.
Therefore, suﬃcient conditions for welfare dominance are
K[
i=k
Hi (α
∗
i y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a] for all k ∈ K.
Necessity:
2. Suppose ∆W ≥ 0 for all utility profiles in Uα , but there exists a k such thatSK
i=kHi (α
∗
i y) > 0 on a certain non-degenerate income interval [a, b], which belongs
to [0, a]; this is only possible if min

sk
α∗k
, . . . ,
sK
α∗K

≤ a, otherwise
SK
i=kHi (α
∗
i a) = 0.
Choose a utility profile (U1, . . . , UK) consisting of twice continuously diﬀerentiable util-
ity functions such that
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


U1 = . . . = Uk−1 : y :→ 0.
Uk :



U

k = C > 0 (and thus U

k = 0), for y ≤ α∗ka
U

k < 0, for α
∗
ka < y < α
∗
kb
Uk = 0 (and thus U

k = U

k = 0), for y ≥ α∗kb
,
Uk+1 : y :→ αk+1Uk

y
αk+1

=
α∗k+1
α∗k
Uk

α∗k
α∗k+1
y

,
Uk+2 : y :→ αk+2Uk+1

y
αk+2

= αk+2αk+1Uk

y
αk+2αk+1

=
α∗k+2
α∗k
Uk

α∗k
α∗k+2
y

,
. . .
UK : y :→
α∗K
α∗k
Uk

α∗k
α∗K
y

,
This profile belongs to Uα. Choosing a ≤ min

sk
α∗k
, . . . ,
sK
α∗K

≤ a, the welfare diﬀerence
for this profile equals
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] sk
sk
Uk (y) d hHk (y) =
K[
i=k
] α∗i b
α∗i a
Ui (y) d hHi (y)
and using partial integration twice and replacing U

i (first step) and a change of variable
(second step), we can rewrite ∆WU as
∆WU =
K[
i=k
] α∗i b
α∗i a
U

i (y)Hi (y) dy =
K[
i=k
] α∗i b
α∗i a
U

i (y)Hi (y) dy
=
K[
i=k
] α∗i b
α∗i a
α∗k
α∗i
U

k

α∗k
α∗i
y

Hi (y) dy =
K[
i=k
] b
a
α∗kU

k (α
∗
ky)Hi (α
∗
i y) dy
=
] b
a
α∗kU

k (α
∗
ky) ~} 
<0 on [a,b]
K[
i=k
Hi (α
∗
i y)
 ~} 
>0 on [a,b]
dy
which is strictly negative and thus contradicts ∆WU ≥ 0.
Proof of proposition 2
Suﬃciency: With F,G and hHk as defined before, the diﬀerence in welfare for a profile
U = (U1, . . . , UK) ∈ Uβ equals:
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] sk
sk
Uk (y) d hHk (y) =
[
k∈K
] β∗ka
β∗ka
Uk (y) d hHk (y) ,
with 0 < a < min

s1
β∗1
, . . . ,
sK
β∗K

and a ≥ max

s1
β∗1
, . . . , sKβ∗K

. Using partial integration
twice, together with the definition of Hk, a change of variable and assumption A4β , we
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get
∆WU = −
[
k∈K
U

k (β
∗
ka)Hk (β
∗
ka) +
[
k∈K
] β∗ka
β∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy
= −
[
k∈K
U

k (β
∗
ka)Hk (β
∗
ka)
 ~} 
A
+
] a
a
[
k∈K
β∗kU

k (β
∗
ky)Hk (β
∗
ky)
 ~} 
B
dy
We can rewrite A and B as
A = − U K (a) ~} 
≥0 via A1
[
i∈K
Hi (β
∗
i a)−
K[
k=2

U

k−1

β∗k−1a

− U k (β∗ka)

 ~} 
≥0 via A2β
#
k−1[
i=1
Hi (β
∗
i a)
$
B = β∗KU

K (β
∗
Ky) ~} 
≤0 via A1
[
i∈K
Hi (β
∗
i y) +
K[
k=2

β∗k−1U

k−1

β∗k−1y

− β∗kU

k (β
∗
ky)

 ~} 
≤0 via A3β
#
k−1[
i=1
Hi (β
∗
i y)
$
.
Therefore, suﬃcient conditions for welfare dominance are
k[
i=1
Hi (β
∗
i y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a] for all k ∈ K.
Necessity:
Suppose∆W ≥ 0 for all utility profiles in Uβ , but there exists a k such thatSki=1Hi (β∗i a) >
0 on a certain non-degenerate income interval [a, b], which belongs to [0, a]; this is only
possible if min

s1
β∗1
, . . . ,
sk
β∗k

≤ a, otherwise
Sk
i=1Hi (β
∗
i a) = 0. Choose a utility profile
(U1, . . . , UK) which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisfies:



U1 :



U

1 = C > 0 (thus U

1 = 0), for all y ≤ a
U

1 < 0, for a < y < b
U1 = 0 (and thus U

1 = U

1 = 0) for y ≥ b
,
U2 : y :→ β2U1

y
β2

= β∗2U1

y
β∗2

,
U3 : y :→ β3U2

y
β3

= β∗3U1

y
β∗3

,
. . .
Uk : y :→ βkUk−1

y
βk

= . . . = β∗kU1

y
β∗k

,
Uk+1 = . . . = UK : y :→ 0.
This profile belongs to Uβ . Choosing a ≤ min

s1
β∗1
, . . . ,
sk
α∗k

≤ a, the welfare diﬀerence
for this profile equals
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] sk
sk
Uk (y) d hHk (y) =
k[
i=1
] β∗i b
β∗i a
Ui (y) d hHi (y)
13
and using partial integration twice and replacing U

i (first step) and a change of variable
(second step), we can rewrite ∆WU as
∆WU =
k[
i=1
] β∗i b
β∗i a
U

i (y)Hi (y) dy =
k[
i=1
] β∗i b
β∗i a
U

i (y)Hi (y) dy
=
k[
i=1
] β∗i b
β∗i a
1
β∗i
U

1

y
β∗i

Hi (y) dy =
k[
i=1
] b
a
U

1 (y)Hi (β
∗
i y) dy
=
] b
a
U

1 (y) ~} 
<0 on [a,b]
k[
i=1
Hi (β
∗
i y)
 ~} 
>0 on [a,b]
dy,
which is strictly negative and thus contradicts ∆WU ≥ 0.
Proof of proposition 3
We focus on the case α 9= β; in case α = β, the proof is the same as for the generalized
Lorenz dominance criterion. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the diﬀerence in welfare
for a profile U = (U1, . . . , UK) ∈ Uβα equals
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] sk
sk
Uk (y) d hHk (y) =
[
k∈K
] α∗ka
α∗ka
Uk (y) d hHk (y) ,
with 0 < a < min

s1
α∗1
, . . . ,
sK
α∗K

and a ≥ max

s1
α∗1
, . . . , sKα∗K

. Notice that, if α 9= β, A4α
and A4β together with A2α imply U

k(α
∗
ka) = 0, for all k ∈ K. Using partial integration
twice, together with the definition of Hk, we get
∆WU =
[
k∈K
] α∗ka
α∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy.
3A. We start with the suﬃcient conditions. Rewrite A3α and A3β for k = K as
1
βK
U

K−1(
y
βK
) ≤ U K(y) ≤
1
αK
U

K−1(
y
αK
).
Let ZK = HK and define an indicator function I which equals 1 if its argument is true
and zero otherwise. We have
] α∗Ka
α∗Ka
U

K (y)HK (y) dy
≥
U α∗Ka
α∗Ka
1
αK
U

K−1

y
αK

I (ZK (y) ≤ 0)ZK (y) dy +
U α∗Ka
α∗Ka
1
βK
U

K−1

y
βK

I (ZK (y) ≥ 0)ZK (y) dy
=
U α∗K−1a
α∗K−1a
U

K−1 (y) I (ZK (αKy) ≤ 0)ZK (αKy) dy +
U α∗KaβK
α∗
K
a
βK
U

K−1 (y) I (ZK (βKy) ≥ 0)ZK (βKy) dy
=
U α∗K−1a
α∗
K
a
βK
U

K−1 (y)
k
I (ZK (αKy) ≤ 0)ZK (αKy) + I

y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βK

I (ZK (βKy) ≥ 0)ZK (βKy)
l
dy,
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where the first equality follows by a change of variable, while the second equality follows
because ZK (αKy) = 0 for all incomes
α∗K
βK
a ≤ y ≤ α∗K−1a. Defining
ZK−1 (y) = HK−1 (y)+I (ZK (αKy) ≤ 0)ZK (αKy)+I

y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βK

I (ZK (βKy) ≥ 0)ZK (βKy) ,
we get (given that HK−1 (y) = 0 for all incomes
α∗K
βK
a ≤ y ≤ α∗K−1a)
K[
k=K−1
] α∗ka
α∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy ≥
] α∗K−1a
α∗
K
βK
a
U

K−1 (y)ZK−1 (y) dy.
In the same way as before, a lower bound for the right-hand side can be obtained as
] α∗K−1a
α∗
K
βK
a
U

K−1 (y)ZK−1 (y) dy
≥
] α∗K−2a
α∗
K
a
βKβK−1
U

K−2 (y)

ZK−2 (y)−HK−2 (y)

dy
with
ZK−2 (y) = HK−2 (y) + I

ZK−1 (αK−1y) ≤ 0

ZK−1 (αK−1y) +
I

y ≤
α∗K−1a
βK−1

I

ZK−1

βK−1y

≥ 0

ZK−1

βK−1y

.
Given that HK−2 (y) = 0 for incomes y ≤
α∗Ka
βKβK−1
≤ α∗K−2a, we get
K[
k=K−2
] α∗ka
α∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy ≥
] α∗K−2a
α∗
K
a
βKβK−1
U

K−2 (y)ZK−2 (y) dy.
Proceeding in this way, we end up with a lower bound for ∆WU , i.e.,
∆WU ≥
] a
α∗
K
β∗
K
a
U

1 (y)Z1 (y) dy,
with
Z1 (y) = H1 (y) + I (Z2 (α2y) ≤ 0)Z2 (α2y) + I

y ≤ α
∗
2a
β2

I (Z2 (β2y) ≥ 0)Z2 (β2y) .
Because Z1 (y) = 0 on
k
0,
α∗K
β∗K
a
l
, suﬃciency of Z1 (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0, a] is straightfor-
ward.
3B. Let us now focus on necessary conditions. Choose ZK = HK . In the same way as
in (3A) we get ] α∗Ka
α∗Ka
U

K (y)HK (y) dy
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≤
U α∗Ka
α∗Ka
1
βK
U

K−1

y
βK

I

ZK (y) ≤ 0

ZK (y) dy +
U α∗Ka
α∗Ka
1
αK
U

K−1

y
αK

I

ZK (y) ≥ 0

ZK (y) dy
=
U α∗KaβK
α∗
K
a
βK
U

K−1 (y) I

ZK (βKy) ≤ 0

ZK (βKy) dy +
U α∗K−1a
α∗K−1a
U

K−1 (y) I

ZK (αKy) ≥ 0

ZK (αKy) dy
=
U α∗K−1a
α∗
K
a
βK
U

K−1 (y)
k
I

y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βK

I

ZK (βKy) ≤ 0

ZK (βKy) + I

ZK (αKy) ≥ 0

ZK (αKy)
l
dy,
where the first equality follows by a change of variable, while the second equality follows
because ZK (αKy) = 0 for all incomes
α∗K
βK
a ≤ y ≤ α∗K−1a. Defining
ZK−1 (y) = HK−1 (y)+I

y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βK

I

ZK (βKy) ≤ 0

ZK (βKy)+I

ZK (αKy) ≥ 0

ZK (αKy) ,
we get (given that HK−1 (y) = 0 for all incomes
α∗K
βK
a ≤ y ≤ α∗K−1a)
K[
k=K−1
] α∗ka
α∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy ≤
] α∗K−1a
α∗
K
βK
a
U

K−1 (y)ZK−1 (y) dy.
In the same way as before, an upper bound for the right-hand side can be obtained as
] α∗K−1a
α∗
K
βK
a
U

K−1 (y)ZK−1 (y) dy
≤
] α∗K−2a
α∗
K
a
βKβK−1
U

K−2 (y)

ZK−2 (y)−HK−2 (y)

dy
with
ZK−2 (y) = HK−2 (y) + I

y ≤
α∗K−1a
βK−1

ZK−1

βK−1y

≤ 0

ZK

βK−1y

+
I

ZK−1 (αK−1y) ≥ 0

ZK−1 (αK−1y) ,
Given that HK−2 (y) = 0 for incomes y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βKβK−1
≤ α∗K−2a, we get
K[
k=K−2
] α∗ka
α∗ka
U

k (y)Hk (y) dy ≤
] α∗K−2a
α∗
K
a
βKβK−1
U

K−2 (y)ZK−2 (y) dy.
Proceeding in this way, we end up with an upper bound for ∆WU , more precisely
∆WU ≤
] a
α∗
K
β∗
K
a
U

1 (y)Z1 (y) dy,
with
Z1 (y) = H1 (y) + I

Z2 (α2y) ≥ 0

Z2 (α2y) + I

y ≤ α
∗
2a
β2

I

Z2 (β2y) ≤ 0

Z2 (β2y) .
Because Z1 equals zero on
k
0,
α∗K
β∗K
a
l
, necessity of Z1 (y) < 0 for some y ∈ [0, a] is obvious.
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Proof of corollary 1
Let β → (1,∞, . . . ,∞). The suﬃcient condition in (4) can be rewritten (by changing
variable) as
H1

y
β∗K

+I

Z2

α2y
β∗K

≤ 0

Z2

α2y
β∗K

+I

y
β∗K
≤ α
∗
2a
β2

I

Z2

β2y
β∗K

≥ 0

Z2

β2y
β∗K

≤ 0
for all y ∈ [0,β∗Ka]. In the limit (i) the first two terms at the left-hand side equal zero
and (ii) I

y
β∗K
≤ α
∗
2a
β2

= 1 = I

Z2

β2y
β∗K

≥ 0

; thus, we proceed with the third term
only and get as the sole suﬃcient condition when β → (1,∞, . . . ,∞)
Z2

β2y
β∗K

≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0,β∗Ka] ,
or equivalently
H2

β∗2y
β∗K

+I

Z3

β2α3y
β∗K

≤ 0

Z3

β2α3y
β∗K

+I

β2y
β∗K
≤ α
∗
3a
β3

I

Z3

β∗3y
β∗K

≥ 0

Z3

β∗3y
β∗K

≤ 0,
for all y ∈ [0,β∗Ka] . Simplifying this term as before (at the limit, some terms equal zero,
while others equal 1), we get
Z3

β∗3y
β∗K

≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0,β∗Ka] .
Proceeding in this way, and using ZK = HK and α
∗
K ≤ β∗K , we end up with
I (y ≤ α∗Ka) I (ZK (y) ≥ 0)ZK (y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0,β∗Ka] ,
I (HK (y) ≥ 0)HK (y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0,α∗Ka] ,
which is possible if and only if HK (y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0,α∗Ka], or equivalently
HK (α
∗
Ky) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a]; call this condition (*). It is possible to repeat this
exercise, by a diﬀerent change of variable, e.g.,
H1

y
β∗K−1

+ I

Z2

α2y
β∗K−1

≤ 0

Z2

α2y
β∗K−1

+
+I

y
β∗K−1
≤ α
∗
2a
β2

I

Z2

β2y
β∗K−1

≥ 0

Z2

β2y
β∗K−1

≤ 0,
for all y ∈

0,β∗K−1a

. This would lead us to
I

y ≤ α∗K−1a

I

ZK−1 (y) ≥ 0

ZK−1 (y) ≤ 0,
for all y ∈

0,β∗K−1a

, or equivalently (using α∗K−1 ≤ β∗K−1 and ZK = HK)
I (HK−1 (y) + I (HK (αKy) ≤ 0)HK (αKy) ≥ 0) (HK−1 (y) + I (HK (αKy) ≤ 0)HK (αKy)) ≤ 0,
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for all y ∈

0,α∗K−1a

. Changing variable in (*), we know that HK (αKy) ≤ 0, for all
y ∈

0,α∗K−1a

, thus I (HK (αKy) ≤ 0) = 1. Thus, we get
I (HK−1 (y) +HK (αKy) ≥ 0) (HK−1 (y) +HK (αKy)) ≤ 0,
for all y ∈

0,α∗K−1a

, which is possible if and only if HK−1 (y) + HK (αKy) ≤ 0, for
all y ∈

0,α∗K−1a

or equivalently HK−1

α∗K−1y

+ HK (α
∗
Ky) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ [0, a].
Proceeding in this way, we can derive all sequential conditions defined in proposition 1.
Proof of corollary 2
2A. First, we prove that for an arbitrary (bounded) function f and scalars 1 ≤ α ≤ β,
we have (for all y ∈ R+) I (f (αy) ≤ 0) f (αy) + I (f (βy) ≥ 0) f (βy) ≤ sup
αy≤x≤βy
f (x);
call it condition (*). In case α = β, condition (*) is obvious. For α 9= β, suppose
I (f (αy) ≤ 0) f (αy) + I (f (βy) ≥ 0) f (βy) > sup
αy≤x≤βy
f (x), for some y ∈ R+. There
are four cases to consider. The case I (f (αy) ≤ 0) = 0, I (f (βy) ≥ 0) = 0 would
lead to f (αy) > 0 > sup
αy≤x≤βy
f (x), a contradiction. The cases I (f (αy) ≤ 0) = 1,
I (f (βy) ≥ 0) = 0 and I (f (αy) ≤ 0) = 0, I (f (βy) ≥ 0) = 1 lead to (the contradic-
tions) f (αy) > sup
αy≤x≤βy
f (x) and f (βy) > sup
αy≤x≤βy
f (x), respectively. The final case
I (f (αy) ≤ 0) = 1, I (f (βy) ≥ 0) = 1 tells us that f (αy) ≤ 0, f (βy) ≥ 0 and thus also
f (βy) ≥ f (αy) + f (βy) > sup
αy≤x≤βy
f (x), a contradiction again.
Second, we use condition (*) to prove that Z1 ≥ Z1. If so, we obtain that whenever
Z1 ≤ 0 also Z1 ≤ 0 holds, as required. We have (for all y ∈ R+) that
ZK−1 (y) = HK−1 (y)+ max
αKy≤x≤βKy
ZK (x)
= HK−1 (y)+ sup
αKy≤x≤βKy
HK (x)
≥ HK−1 (y) + I (ZK (αKy) ≤ 0)ZK (αKy) + I (ZK (βKy) ≥ 0)ZK (βKy)
≥ HK−1 (y) + I (ZK (αKy) ≤ 0)ZK (αKy) + I

y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βK

I (ZK (βKy) ≥ 0)ZK (βKy)
 ~} 
ZK−1(y)
where (i) the second equality follows from the definition ZK = HK and the fact that
the maximum exists (and thus equals the supremum), (ii) the first inequality uses (*),
and (iii) the second inequality comes from the fact that I (ZK (βKy) ≥ 0)ZK (βKy) ≥ 0
everywhere. Taking the supremum (which equals the maximum, if the latter exists) on
both sides, we get
max
αK−1y≤x≤βK−1y
ZK−1 (y) ≥ sup
αK−1y≤x≤βK−1y
ZK−1 (y) .
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Using (*) again for the right-hand side, adding HK−2 (y) to both sides and using the
definitions of ZK−2 (y) and ZK−2 (y), we obtain ZK−2 (y) ≥ ZK−2 (y) (for all y ∈ R+).
Proceeding this way, we end up with Z1 (y) ≥ Z1 (y) (for all y ∈ R+), as required.
2B. Second, replacing f by −f in (*) we have (for all y ∈ R+) I (f (αy) ≥ 0) f (αy) +
I (f (βy) ≤ 0) f (βy) ≥ inf
αy≤x≤βy
f (x); call it condition (**). In the same way as before,
we deduce (for all y ∈ R+) that
HK−1 (y)+ min
αKy≤x≤βKy
HK (x)
≤ HK−1 (y) + I

ZK (αKy) ≥ 0

ZK (αKy) + I

ZK (βKy) ≤ 0

ZK (βKy)
≤ HK−1 (y) + I

ZK (αKy) ≥ 0

ZK (αKy) + I

y ≤ α
∗
Ka
βK

I

ZK (βKy) ≤ 0

ZK (βKy)
 ~} 
ZK−1(y)
where (i) the first inequality uses (**) and (ii) the second inequality follows from the fact
that I

ZK (βKy) ≥ 0

ZK (βKy) ≤ 0 everywhere. Let Z◦K−1 (y) = HK−1 (y)+ minαKy≤x≤βKy
HK (x). Taking the infimum (which equals the minimum, if the latter exists) on both
sides, we get
min
αK−1y≤x≤βK−1y
Z◦K−1 (y) ≤ inf
αK−1y≤x≤βK−1y
ZK−1 (y) .
Using (**) again for the right-hand side, adding HK−2 (y) to both sides and using the
definition of ZK−2 (y) and defining Z◦K−2 (y) = HK−2 (y)+ minαK−1y≤x≤βK−1y
Z◦K−1 (x),
we obtain Z◦K−2 (y) ≤ ZK−2 (y) (for all y ∈ R+). Proceeding this way, we end up
with Z◦1 (y) ≤ Z1 (y) (for all y ∈ R+). So, whenever the necessary conditions in (5) are
satisfied also Z◦1 (y) < 0 holds for some y ∈ [0, a]. The other way around, if Z◦1 (y) ≥ 0 for
all y ∈ [0, a]–which is equivalent with G ?FHT F , basically because we can recursively
replace min (−Z◦k) by −maxZ◦k in the expression for Z◦1– then the necessary conditions
in (5) cannot be satisfied.
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